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COMBAT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TEAM 
-A-10/GAU-8 LOW ANGLE FIRINGS 
versus 
SIMULATED SOVIET TANK COMPANY 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Under the technical direction of the Combat Damage Assess-
ment Committee (CDAC), the Combat Damage Assessment Team (COAT) 
conducted firings of the A-10/GAU-8 weapon system against an 
array of 10 tanks simulating a Soviet tank company deployed for 
an attack. The COAT used M-47 tanks stowed with ammunition, 
diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew mannikins to simulate 
the Soviet tanks. The pilots of the two A-10 aircraft used in 
the firings conducted their attack at low altitudes and low 
dive angles simulating approach and attack below the altitudes 
of effective engagement for an opposing air defense network 
employing acquisition and fire control radar. The purpose of 
the test was to evaluate the effects of the 30mm APIT antitank 
ammunition of the GAU-8 gun under stringent conditions of en-
gagement for the A-10/GAU-8 system against simulated Soviet 
main battle tanks. 
The Combat Damage Assessment Committee assessed the results 
of the low angle cannon firings of the two A-10 aircraft against 
the simulated Soviet tank company as follows: 
1. Attack Parameters: The pilots flew combat two ship 
tactics remaining below 300 feet altitude for the entire attack. 
To minimize exposure to an assumed air defense threat and the 
targets ability to significantly improve its posture during the 
attack, all firing passes were compressed into a time span of 0 
4 minutes and 12 seconds. The attack dive angles averaged 3.2 
during 12 passes on the targets. The pilots opened fire at 
slant ranges which averaged 3493 feet and ceased fire at ranges 
which averaged 2404 feet, and fired 1684 rounds in 12 bursts 
averaging 2.08 seconds each. 
2. Weapon Effects: The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system achieved 
253 impacts on the 10 tank targets. The ratio of impacts to 
total rounds fired was 0.15. The weapon system achieved 43 
perforations of the armored envelopes of the tanks with a ratio 
of perforations to impacts of 0.17. Many projectiles, which 
did not perforate armor, severely damaged exterior track and 
suspension components of the tanks. 
3. Damage Assessment: The attacking A-10/GAU-8 weapon 
system inflicted eight 100% Mobility Kills of which four were 
also catastrophic K-Kills in the company array of ten tanks. 
The remaining 2 tanks escaped with light mobility damage. 
4. Test Conditions: Ceiling and visibility were unlimited 
during the firing and the target tanks were sited in open, flat 
desert terrain. After the first two passes, black smoke from 
1 
catastrophically destroyed tanks was eveident but did not 
appear to adversely effect pilot gunnery during the remaining 
passes. 
5. Conclusions: The A-10/GAU-8 weapon system either 
catastrophically destroyed or immobilized 8 of 10 combat loaded 
M-47 tanks. The observed and documented results support the 
conclusion that: 
a. GAU-8 30mm APIT projectiles are lethal against M-47 
~nd similarly protected tanks, e.g., Soviet T-55 and T-62 
tanks, under challenging and realistic firing conditions. 
b. GAU-8 30mm APIT projectiles can inflict catastrophic 
and immobilizing damage on main battle tanks (MBTs) in low 
level attacks against the sides and rear of such heavily armor-
ed targets. The mission indicated that a two ship flight 
possesses the required firepower to ·destroy the operational 
effectiveness of a tank company formation. 
c. From the viewpoint of target kills and ammunition 
effectiveness, the attack parameters emplyed in the test appear 
to be satisfactory in the attack of heavily armored targets. 
Low altitude attacks have essentially the same effectiveness as 
higher attack angles. 
d. The rapidity of the attack indicates the A-10/GAU-8 
weapons systems ability to destroy a perishable multi-target 
formation (i.e., one with high mobility that can rapidly dis-
perse, move to cover, or maneuver to interrupt line-of-sight 
observation from the attacking aircraft). 
6. The overall results of the test are summarized in Table I. 
·column one in the. table shows that the A-10 aircraft made 12 
passes,and column two shows that the aircraft fired against 10 
tanks designated numbers 1-10. Column two also shows that 
several of the tanks were impacted in more than one firing 
pass either as primary, secondary or incidental targets. The 
COAT was unable to correlate 20 observed impacts with a given 
firing pass and, thus, the bottom row of the table shows 
those impacts associated with the three targets which they 













































SUMMARY OF ATTACK PARAMETERS AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
SIMULATED SOVIET TANK COMPANY, 10 MARCH 1978 
(TOTAL TIME OF ATTACK, 4 MIN. 12 SEC.)* 
SLANT RANGE DIVE BURST ROUNDS 
(FEET) ANGLE LENGTH FIRED IMPACTS PERFS 
OPEN CEASE (0) (SEC) TOTAL 
? ? ? *** *** 23 7 
3670 2395 4.7 2.40 163 10 1 
? ? ? *** *** 13 3 
? ? 
~ t .!. 5 0 I 
? ? ? t t 27 5 
3490 2009 4.0 2.27 154 33 11 
4261 2641 1.4 3.04 208 24 1 
4130 3622 6.6 1.35 90 20tt 3tt 
3482 1829 2.2 2.49 166 13 1 
? ? 2.0 1.46 97 14 1 
2846 2100 2.6 1.31 87 6 0 
3134 2292 1.3 1.94 131 10 1 
3404 2345 3.4 2.06 139 12 0 
2268 ? ? . 1.88 126 6 0 
4016 2302 6.1 2.67 182 17 6 
3636 2505 1.4 2.08 141 -- --
? ? ? ? ? 20 3 
TOTALS OR 3307 2157 
AVERAGES 
3.2 2.08 1684 253 43 
KILL ASSESSMENT TOTAL 
M F K TA1TJZS 
nmoB 
-- -- 100 X 
-- -- -- --
-- -- -- --
-- -- -- --
-- -- -- --
-- -- 100 X 
100 -- -- X. 
-- -- 100 X 
100 -- -- X 
-- -- 100 X 
5 -- -- --
100 40 -- X 
5 -- -- --
-- -- -- --
100 5 -- X 
-- -- -- --
-- -- -- --
4 TA:m~S K-KILLED 
8 TANKS IlfMOBILIZED (X) 
* REFERENCE: Kevin Gravois et al.·, Results of the_ A-lOA Combat Lethality Assessment Test of 10 March 19/8, 
General Electric, Burlington, Vermont, 11 Aug 1978, and field notes of the Post strike Damage Assessment 
and Test Data groups. 
** *** t tt At open fire. Target 2 was primary target. Target 10 was primary target. Total, passes. 4 and 12. 
APPENDIX A 
COMBAT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TEAM 
A-10/GAU-8 LOW ANGLE FIRINGS 
versus 
SIMULATED SOVIET TANK COMPANY 




Since February 1978, the Armament Directorate, A-10 
Syst~m Program Office, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, 
has conducted firing tests using the A-10/GAU-8 system in low 
level, air-to-ground engagements of armored targets. The 
tests have been conducted within the framework of the GAJ-8 
30mm ammunition Lot Acceptance Verification Program (L:\VP) -
Airborne. The LAVP has the following objectives which apply 
to the present tests: 
A. To evaluate the performance of existing 
production lots of GAU-8 ammunition when fired 
from the air under operational conditions. 
B. To evaluate the lethality of GAU-8 ammunition 
against armored targets when fired at low level 
from A-10 aircraft using operational tactics. 
To conduct the LAVP program, the Armament Directorate 
has cooperated with Headquarters, Tactical Air Cornman, Langley 
AFB, Virginia and with the Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, 
Nellis AFB, Nevada. Within the framework of that cooperation, 
the Armament Directorate has set up a Combat Damage Assessment 
Team (CDAT) to plan and execute the firing tests and evaluate 
the results. The CDAT functions under the direction of a 
Combat Damage Assessment Committee (CDAC) which has prepared 
this report. 
II. Test Philosophy 
To generate realistic data, the CDAT determined to use a 
highly empirical technique of destructive testing of actual 
target tanks. Tests have involved firings at individual tanks 
in November 1977 and February - March 1978. The experimental 
setup for the firings of 10 March 78 involved the first use of 
a multitarget, tactically arrayed tank formation for attack by 
the A-10/GAU-8 system. The CDAT elected to simulated a Soviet 
tank company as organized within a tank division as the target 
array for two attacking A-10 aircraft. As few constraints as 
possible were placed on the attacking pilots in an attempt to 
develop as much realism as possible. Figure 1 shows the test 
factors which would have been ideal, and the practicable set-
up which was achieved. 
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FIGURE 1 
Empirical Test Phi_losophy 
Comp~rison of Ide3l & Practicublc Test Situ3tions 
Ideal 
Test Parameters 
1. Air Attack Realism 
a. Actual A-10/GAU-8---------
b. 30mm APIT-----------------
c. European Weather & -------
Terrain 
d. Optimum open fire---------
ranges (2000 feet) 
e. Low altitude attack-------
( <5° Dive Anglel 
2. Air Defense Realism 
a. Automatic cannon firing---
at A/C 
b. Missile systems firing----
at A/C 
c. Small arms firing at A/C--
d. AD suppression by A/C-----
3. Threat Targets and Doctrine 
a. T62/T64/T72 high fidelity-
targets 
b. Stowed combat loads-------
(in T-62/T-64/T72) 
c. Realistic crew station----
postures 





1. Air Attack Realism 
a. Actual A-10/GAU-8 
b. 30mm APIT 
c. Nevada desert terrain 
and Weather 
d. Long open fire ranges 
(4000-3000 ft safety 
constraints) 
e. Low altitude attack 
(<.5~ Dive Angle) 
2. Air Defense Realism 
a. Low altitude, low angle, 
minimum exposure attacks 
vs·assumed AD system 
b. Ditto 
c. Ditto 
d. No suppression simulation 
in test 
3. Threat Targets and Doctrine 
a. Simulated Soviet Tanks 
b. Stowed combat loads 
(in US M-47) 
c. Wooden crew mannikins 
d. Static combat formation 
e. Stationary targets 
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III. The Simulated Ground Combat Situation 
The firing test of 10 March 1978 consisted of an attack 
by two A-10 aircraft on a simulated Soviet tank company. 
The scenario depicted a Soviet tank company in the role of a 
lead march security detachment (LMSD) for its battalion, 
which in turn, is the advance guard of a larger mobile forma-
tion. The LMSD is operating approximately five kilometers in 
front of the battalion column. The mission of the LMSD is to 
ensure the uninterrupted advance of the battalion and provide 
security against attack. Upon meeting heavy resistance, the 
company deploys into an appropriate combat formation to re-
duce the resistance or form a base of fire for offensive ac-
tion by the remainder of the battalion. 
One of the most important missions of the A-10 aircraft 
is the blunting of armored spearheads in conjunction with 
U.S. and allied ground forces. The airborne speed and range 
of the A-10 gives it the flexibility to intervene against 
deeply penetrating enemy armor in support of hard pressed 
ground forces unable to move the approximate ground strength. 
Oncer such tactical circumstances, it becomes particularly 
important for the A-10 to slow or halt advancing armor in 
order that (1) ground forces can mass to counter the break-
through, and (2) ground forces can increase their antitank 
effectiveness by engaging slowed or immobilized enemy armor. 
In the firing test of 10 March 78, the attacking A-10 air-
craft immobilized eight out of ten simulated Soviet tanks 
in 4 min., 12 sec. 
A Soviet tank company, operating as simulated in the 
firing test, would probably have other units attached to it 
for its support. Attached units might include any one or 
all of the following elements: (1) motorized rifle platoon, 
(2) engineer detachment, (3) chemical defense element, (4) 
anti-aircraft defense elements, (5) a battery of self pro-
pelled artillery. The company simulated in the firing test 
consisted of tanks alone. The formation was arranged with 
two platoons up and one back simulating an assault posture. 
The tanks were not maneuvered during the firing test and the 
forma~ion was essentially a "snapshot: of the company at a 
single point in time" (See Figure 6). 
IV. The Target Tanks 
The most effective targets available in sufficient num-
bers to simulate Soviet T-55 and T-62 tanks were US M-47 
tanks . Both of the Soviet tank models are similar in armor 
A-3 
protection to the M-47. With the appropriate purging of 
the gasoline fuel system of the US tanks, the·CDAT managed 
to field a target similar also in survivability to the T-55 
and T-62 tanks from the viewpoint of ignitable. internal ma-
terial. The Soviet T-64 and later model tanks are ill-under-
stood from the viewpoints of armor protection and the ar-
rangement of internal components. The decision was made, 
~ccordingly, to simulate the better defined earlier model 
Soviet Tanks. 
The M-47 tanks used in the firing test, although gen-
erally similar in survivability to Soviet T-55 and T-62 
tanks, can be contrasted as follows. The rear surfaces of 
the US and Soviet tanks are significantly different, with 
the most important contrast being the large overhang on the 
US vehicle. The overhang in combination with the attacked 
stowage box and the lack of ammunition in the turret would 
seem to make the M-4 7 tanks particularly invulnerable to 
K-Kills associated with perforations through the rear of 
the turret. First, the rear of the US turret is difficult 
to perforate because of the heavy gauge steel stowage box 
and second, peforating projectiles and spall must traverse 
several feet of inert components before contacting either 
crew members or stowed ammunition. 
Test data tend to support the above analysis, showing, 
for example that no K-Kill was inflicted by projectiles im-
pacting from a rear aspect. In contrast, the Soviet T-55 
and T-62 tanks have no overhang and carry ammunition in 
ready racks at the rear of the turrets. The M-47 tank has 
no special features at the sides of the turrets and hulls, 
which are similar to the turret overhang, and, because of 
slightly thinner armor on the side of the hull and a less 
efficiently shaped turret at the sides, would have to be 
acknowledged as slightly more vulnerable to perforation by 
kinetic energy projectiles. 
The M-47 tanks used for targets were in excellent con-
dition f~om the viewpoint of damage assessment. The exterior 
mobility components were complete. The interior components 
were less complete but included all of the most essential 
items, e.g., main gun, engine, transmission, fuel tanks, am-
munition racks, etc. Other items such as oil coolers, range 
finders, vision devices, and radios, were not present in all 
tanks. 
The most sensitive internal items from the viewpoint 
of catastrophic kills and Mand F kill assessments are the 
following, which were placed in the test tanks as noted: 
A-4 
Generic Sensitive Item Test Item 
1. Ammunition---------------------us Cartridge, 90mm TP-T 
2. Fuel---------------------------Nurnber 2 Diesel 
3. Oil----------------------------Oil in Engine, Transmis-
sion and Drive Components 
4. Personnel----------------------Articulated Plywood Man-
nikins 
The tanks were static during the test and their engines 
were not running, with the result that the fuel and oil were 
much cooler and more inert than would have been and the case 
with a static vehicle with its engine running or a maneuver-
ing tank. The kill ratios achieved in the firing test of 10 
March therefore, are probably conservative from the viewpoint 
of fires resulting from ignited fuel and oil. 
V. The Test and Results 
The test itself consisted of bringing together the am-
munition (Figure 2), gun (Figure 3), aircraft (Figure 4), and 
combat configured target tanks (Figure 5/Table I} into a re-
alistic target array (Figure 6) for the purpose of simulating 
several minutes of air-to-ground combat. 
The pilots flew two ship, combat tactics remaining be-
low 300 feet altitude and pressed their attacks at low dive 
angles simulating operations below the altitudes for acqusi-
tion and tracking by an opposing air defense system during 
the entire attack. The attack was compressed into a time 
span of 4 minutes, 12 seconds in recognition of survivability 
considerations and time constraints involved in the succesful 
attack of a fleeting target. Additional realism was obtained 
by permitting the pilots to deviate approximately 45° to the 
right and left of a "run-in" line on a heading of 45° magnetic 
established for safety purposes (Figure 6). 
In this mission the pilots experimented initially with 
somewhat different attack tactics. There was some thought 
that a long burst combined with a sight alignment on two or 
more targets could provide a bonus effect by yielding a multi-
kill capability per pass becuase of the overspray of projec-
tiles in the target area. The target array (Figure 6) pro-
vided opportunities for test of the theory. 
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Figure 5. -- UNITED STATES M-47 COMBAT TANK 
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NOS REFER TO NUMERALS PAINTED ON TANK 
Figure 6. - - A-10 COMBAT LEI'HALITY TARGET ARRAY 
















NOTE: The pilots were restricted 
in their attacks to a sec-
tor of 90-270° magnetic, 
hence, the concentration 
of attacks in that 180° 
sector. 




IP0:411/ Pl= Pilot/Plane 1 
P2 = Pilot/Plane 2 l'l-6 
UNK = Killing Pass 
Unknown ~~ Pl-~ Pl-1 = Plane 1, Pass 270 270° 
1, etc. 















Figure 7 - - Primary, Secondary or 







Pilot Pl, accordingly, attacked targets 2, 1, and 3 on 
his first pass, and pilot P2 almost simultaneously attacked 
targets 10, 9, and 8 (See Figure 7). The multi-kill theory 
did not prove out. Only in the case of target 1, which was 
a K-Kill, was the killing projectile identified as having im-
pacted a secondary target. In the remaining five cases, the 
most damaging impacts were associated with primary targets 
in four instances and no specific target in one instance. 
The pilots subsequently reverted to attacks against single 
targets. 
In the mission overall, the pilots conducted 12 passes,· 
which resulted in impacts against 20 individual targets in 
the 10-tank array. The single and multiple target situation 
was the following: (1) four targets were impacted by one 
aircraft on one pass, (2) two targets were impacted by pro-
jectiles from two different passes, (3) four targets were 
impacted by projectiles from three different passes. The 
pilots fired a total of 1684 rounds and achieved 253 impacts 
against the targets including 43 perforations of the armor. 
The attacks were made at attack aspect angles ranging 
from 145-270° The pilots made 55% of the attacks against 
the left side of the targets at aspect angles of 225-270°. 
The attacks against the left side resulted in 63% of the 
total number of tanks immobilized and 100% of the K-Kills. 
These data are displayed in Tables II and III. 
The air attack resulted in four catastrophically killed 
tanks (K-Kills), four immobilized tanks (100% M-Kill), and 
two lightly impacted tanks with mobility type damage. The 
strength of the tank company was reduced to 20% of the ori-
ginal, and combat effectiveness as a company to some lower 
figure. {See Table IV) . 
The overall results of the·test are presented in 
Table V. 
VI. COMBAT DAMAGE ASSESSMENT 
The CDAT was responsible for assessing the damage re-
sulting from the attack, assigning kill factors, and publish-
ing the overall report. The damage and kill assessment was 
based on cumulative damage from all attacks . Where possible, 
damage resulting from individual attacks was assessed inde-
pendently as part of the overall evaluation of each target. 
Where the independent assessment of an individual attack is 
made, the assessment is presented with the caveat that when 
ear l ier attacks did not result in crew casualties or seriously 
degrade mobilit¼ the posture of tanks on a dy11a~ic battlefi~ld 





































TABLE II. ROUNDS FIRED, IMPACTS, AND PERFORA-
TIONS AS A FUNCTION OF ATTACK ASPECT 
ANGLE (10 MAR 78) 
A-13 
ATTACK TANK 
ASPECT KILLING TARGET KILL ASSESMENT 
ANGLE PASS IMPACTED M F K 
270° Pl-1 1 100% 
270° P2-4 10 100% 
230-270% UNK 9 100% 
225° P2-2/P2-6 8 100% 
225° P2-4 3 100% 40% 
190-270° UNK 5 10% 
180° Pl-3 6 100% 
180° Pl-2 7 100% 
160° Pl-6 2 100% 95% 
145° Pl-5 4 5% 
DISCUSSION: The table shows that the four catastrophic kills 
were at attack aspects of 225-270° representing predominately 
side surfaces of the tanks. High percentage mobility kills 
predominated, in contrast, at attack aspects of 145°-190°, 
which represent largely rear surfaces of the tanks. 
TABLE III. A-10/GAU-8 EFFECTIVENESS IN COMBAT 
VS SIMULATED SOVIET TANK COMPANY 
AS A FUNCTION OF ATTACK ASPECT A1:1GLE 
(10 MAR 78) 
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= ""ff= 0.67 
4 
=""ff= 0.33 
*IMMOBILIZED TANKS= 100% M-KILLS AND K-KILLS 
TABLE IV. A-10/GAU-8 EFFECTIVENESS IN SIMULATED 
COMBAT VS SIMULATED SOVIET TANK COMPANY, 
RATIOS OF KILLS PER PASS (10 MAR 78) 
TABULATED NUMBER 
DATA AND/OR PERCENT 
Number of Passes 12 
Number of Impacted 20 
Total Rounds Fired 1684 
Total Impacts on Targets 253 (15%) 
Total Perforations Through Armor 
K-Kills Per Pass 
M-Kills Per Pass 
Tanks Immobilized Per Pass 





TABLE V. TABULATED SUMMARY OF DATA FOR A-10/GAU-8 
FIRINGS OF 10 MAR 78 
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Some targets were assessed as catastrophically destroyed 
even though direct observation showed a delay between the 
attack and the burning or explosion of the vehicle. Such an 
assessment was made on the basis of evidence of simultaneous 
crew casualties which made it highly improbable that the crew 
would have any capability to resist the propagation of small 
fires into killing fires and explosions. 
The assessment of weapon effects and the assignment of 
kill values is discussed below. Each target is examined 
individually in an identical format which includes a descrip-
tion of the attacks/passes; the number of impacts resulting 
in perforations, significant damage and insignificant damage; 
a multiple pass/attack assessment where possible; and the 
rationale behind the overall assessment. The examination 
comprises a brief single page description of each pass and 
the weapon effects and damage resulting from it. Each ex-
amination sheet is followed by one or more photographs which 
illustrate the more significant weapon effects ·and/or damage 
on the target tank. Perforations, damaging hits in exterior 
suspension components, and impacts on crew mannikins are 
typically shown in the photographs. 
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Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 1 
1. Description: Attacked during passes Pl-1, P2-5, and one 
unidentified pass. Kill attributed to Pl-1. 
2. Kill Assessment: 100% K-Kill resulting from the following 
effects: 
a. Perforations: 7 
b. Significant Damage: Omitted - Catastrophic fire and 
explosion overrides other damage. 
c. Insignificant Damage: Omitted - Catastrophic fire and 
explosion overrides other damage. 
3. Multiple Pass Assessment: Not possible 
4.· Rationale for Kill Assessment: 100% K-Kill due to a fuel 
fire resulting from Impact 25 (Figure 8) which could not 
be extinguished by the crew because of casualties inflicted 
by Impacts 5 and 6 (.Figure 9), and 16 (Figure 10). 
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IMPACT 25, 






LEFT HULL AND 
TANK 
A-18 
PENETRATION INTO LEFT 
FIGURE 9 - TARGET 1 





FIGURE 10 - TARGET 1 
IMPACT 16, PERFORATION OF LEFT HULL INTO DRIVER'S COMPARTMENT 
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Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 2 
1. Description: Attacked during passes Pl-1 and Pl-6 
Kill attributed to Pl-6. 
2. Kill Assessment: 100% M-Kill, 95% F-Kill resulting 
from the following effects: 
a. Perforation: 7 
b. Significant Damage: 8 
c. Insignificant Damage: 12 
3. Multiple Pass Assessment: 
PASS Pl-1 
M - Kill: None 
F - Kill: 20% (Based on 
penetrations thru gun tube) 
PASS Pl-6 
M - Kill: 100% (Based on 
penetrations into transmis-
sion case) 
F - Kill: 95% (Based on 
"sole suvivor" criterion 
for crew casualties) 
4. Rationale for Kill Assessment: 
a. M-Kill: 100% M-Kill due to transmission damage 
resulting from Impacts 16 and 18 (Figure 11) 
b. F-Kill: 95% F-Kill due to crew casualties (sole 
survivor criteria) inflicted by Impacts 1 and 3 
(Figure 12) and to Impacts 4 and 5 (Figure 13) 
which penetrated the gun tube. 
A-21 
FIGURE 11 - TARGET 2 
IMPACTS 14, 15, 16 and 18, PERFORATIONS OF REAR HULL INTO 
ENGINE COMPARTMENT 
A-22 
FIGURE 12- TARGET 2 
IMPACTS 1 and 3, PERFORATIONS OF RIGHT TURRET INTO FIGHTING 
COMPARTMENT 
A-23 
FIGURE 13 - TARGET 2 
IMPACTS 4 and 5, PENETRATIONS THROUGH GUN TUBE 
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Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 3 
1. Description: Attacked during passes Pl-1, P2-4, and 
one unidentified pass. Kill attributed to P2-4. 
2. Kill Assessment: 100% M-Kill, 40% F-Kill resulting 
from the following effects: 
a. Perforations: 4 
b. Significant Damage: 7 
d. Insignificant Damage: 13 
3. Multiple Pass Assessment: 
PASS Pl-1 
M - Kill: None 
F - Kill: 20% (Based on 
possible loss of power 
and gun elevation and 
traverse, and a perfor-
ation thru the gun tube) 
PASS P2-4 
M - Kill: 100% (Based on 
damage to the track adjust-
ing idler wheel) 
F - Kill: 20% (Based on 
casualty criteria associa-
ted with loss of the driver) 
4. Rationale for Kill Assessment: 
a. M-Kill: 100% M-Kill due to track adjusting idler 
wheel damage resulting from Impact 5 (Figure 14) 
driver casualty inflicted by Impact 7 (Figure 15) 
b. F-Kill: 40% F-Kill based on driver casualty cri-
teria, possible loss of power elevation and traverse, 
and penetration through the gun tube. 
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FIGURE 14 - TARGET 3 
IMPACT 7, PERFORATION OF LEFT HULL INTO DRIVER'S COMPARTMENT 
AND IMPACT 5, PENETRATION OF LEFT IDLER WHEEL HUB 
A-26 
FIGURE 15 TARGET 3 
DAMAGE TO MANNIKIN AT DRIVER'S 
STATION CAUSED BY IMPACT NO. 7 
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Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 4 
1. Description: Attacked during pass Pl-5 only. 
2. Kill Assessment: 5% M-Kill resulting from the following 
effects: 
a. Perforations: 0 
b. Significant Damage: 
c. Insignificant Damage: 




4. Rationale for Kill Assessment: Light damage to 2 road-
wheels, 2 shock absbrbers, and 1 track center guide by 
Impacts 7, 8, and 11. Most severe damage indicated by 




FIGURE 16 TARGET 




1 ROAD WHEEL 
Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 5 
1. Description: Attacked during passes P2-l and Pl-4. 
Damage divided approximately equal between passes. 
2. Kill Assessment: 10% M-Kill resulting from the follow-
ing effects: 
a. Perforations: 0 
b. Significant Damage: 4 
c. Insignificant Damage: 7 
3. Multiple Pass Assessment: 
PASS P2-l 
M - Kill: 5% (Associated 
with damage resluting 
from impacts 5, 7 and 8} 
F - Kill: None 
PASS Pl-4 
M - Kill: 5% (Associated 
with damage resulting from 
impact 11} 
F - Kill: None 
4. Rationale for Kill Assessment: Cumulative (5% each 
pass} damage to track support roller, 2 center guides, 
3 tank shoes, 1 end connector, and 1 drive sprocket by 
Impacts 5, 7, 8, and 11. Most severe damage indicated 
by Impact 11 (Figure 17}. 
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FIGURE 17 - TARGET 5 
IMPACT 11, DAMAGED TRACK SHOES, END CONNECTOR AND 
DRIVE SPROCKET 
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Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 6 
1. Description: Attacked during pass Pl-3 only. 
2. Kill Assessment: 100% M-Kill resulting from the following 
effects: 
a. Perforations: 1 
b. Significant Damage: 4 
c. Insignificant Damage: 8 
3. Multiple Pass Assessment: N/A 
4. Rationale for Kill Assessment: 100% M-Kill due to perforated 
transmission oil cooler inlet and outlet lines resulting 
from Impact 9 (Figure 18). 
A-32 
FIGURE 18 - TARGET 6 
IMPACT 9, SPALL 
TRANSMISSION OIL 
FRAGMENT PENETRATIONS INTO 
COOLER INLET AND OUTLET LINES 
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Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 7 
1. Description: Attacked during Pl-2 only. 




a. Perforations: 1 
b. Significant Damage: 7 
c. Insignificant Damage: 16 
.Multiple Pass Assessment: N/A 
Rationale for Kill Assessment: 100% M-Kill due to severed 
transmission shifting control rod, severed engine oil 
cooler outlet line, and severed transmission oil cooler 
inlet and outlet lines resulting from Impact 19 (Figures 
19 and 20). 
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FIGURE 19 - TARGET 7 
IMPACT 19, PERFORATION INTO ENGINE COMPARTMENT 
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II 
-._...-::·: ··_;.= : ... \./:~.J.:t!·: 
. . 
FIGURE 20 - TARGET 7 
SEVERED OIL COOLER INLET AND OUTLET LINES, IMPACT NO. 19 
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Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 8 
1. Description: Attacked during passes P2-l, P2-2, and P2-6. 
Kill attributed to passes P2-2 and P2-6. 
2. Kill Assessment: 100% K-Kill resulting from the following 
effects: 
a. Perforations: 3 
b. Significant Damage: Omitted - Catastrophic fire and 
explosions overrides other damage. 
c. Insignificant Damage: Omitted - Catastrophic fire and 
explosions overrides other damage. 
3. Multiple Pass Assessment: Not Possible 
4. Rationale for Kill Assessment: 100% K-Kill due to a fuel 
fire resulting from Impact 19 which could not be extinguished 
by the crew because of casualties inflicted by Impact 2. 
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Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 9 
1. Description: Attacked during passes P2-l, P2-3 and one 
unidentified pass. Kill could not be attributed to a 
specific pass. 
2. Kill Assessment: 100% K-Kill resulting from the following 
effects: 
a. Perforations: 9 
b. Significant Damage: Omitted - Catastrophic fire and 
explosions override other damage. 
c. Insignificant Damage: Omitted - Catastrophic fire and 
explosions override other damage. 
3. Multiple Pass Assessment: Not Possible 
4. Rationale for Kill Assessment: 100% K-Kill due to multiple 
perforations into the fighting compartment (2), driver's 
compartment (2}, and hull (5), which caused at least 4 crew 
casualties, two penetrations into the left bulkhead ammuni-
tion stowage area, and one penetration into the left fuel 
tank (Figures 21, 22, and 23). 
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FIGURE 21 - TARGET 9 
IMPACTS 5 AND 8, PERFORATIONS OF LEFT 
TURRET INTO FIGHTING COMPARTMENT 
A-39 
FIGURE 22 - TARGET 9 
IMPACTS 23 AND 26, PERFORATIONS OF LEFT HULL INTO BULK-
HEAD AMMUNITION STOWAGE COMPARTMENT 
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FIGURE 23 - TARGET 9 
IMPACT 30, PERFORATION OF LEFT HULL 
INTO LEFT FUEL TANK 
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Tank Target Damage Summary 
M-47 Tank Number 10 
1. Description: Attacked during pass P2-l only. 
2. Kill Assessment: 100% K-Kill resulting from the following 
effects. 
a. Perforations: 11 
b. Significant Damage: Omitted - Catastrophic fire and 
explosions overrides other damage. 
c. Insignificant Damage: Omitted - Catastrophic fire and 
explosions overrides other damage. 
3. Multiple Pass Assessment: N/A 
4. Rationale for Kill Assessment: 100% K-Kill due to multiple 
perforations into the fighting compartment (4) and hull 
(7) which caused at least 3 crew casualties, one penetra-
tion into the left bulkhead ammunition stowage area, two 
penetrations into the left fuel tank, and three penetrations 
into the engine compartment (Figures 24 and 25). 
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FIGURE 24 TARGET 10 
IMPACT 16, PERFORATION OF LEFT TURRET 
INTO FIGHTING COMPARTMENT 
FIGURE 25 - TARGET 10 
IMPACTS 24 AND 25, PERFORATIONS OF LEFT 
HULL AND PENETRATIONS INTO THE LEFT FUEL TANK 
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VIII. Summary and Conclusions 
Working within the framework of the Lot Acceptance veri-
fication Program (LAVP) of the Armaments Directorate, A-10 
System Program Office, and on the basis of general coopera-
tion between the USAF Systems and Tactical Air Commands, two 
pilots of the 66th Fighter Weapons Squadron, Nellis AFB, 
Nevada, attacked a simulated Soviet tank company with A-10/GAU-8 
weapon systems on 10 March 1978. The Soviet tank company was 
simuulated by 10 M-47 tanks, which were loaded with 90mm TP 
ammunition, diesel fuel, lubricating oil, and crew mannikins. 
The purpose of the test was to increase knowledge of the 
lethality of the GAU-8 30mm armor piercing ammunition when 
fired at low altitudes and dive angles by A-10 aircraft. The 
damage assessment technique used in the test was one of live 
firing against high fidelity, combat loaded MBTs with weapon 
effects and damage assessed on the basis of results obtained 
against actual main battle tanks.- The data obtained are 
summarized generally in Table V. 
The most numerous and effective attack aspect angle was 
270° against the left sides of the target tanks, which accounted 
for 63% of the impacts, 74% of the perforations and 100% of the 
K-Kills, while comprising only about 50% of thefi~in~passes. 
The superior lethality demonstrated by the passes which ·took 
place directly or predominately from a side aspect is in accor-
dance with the following observed factors and largely explained 
by them: 
(1) Low horizontal obliquity angles, i.e. the projec-
tiles are impacting at right angles to the side surfaces. 
(2) Armor thlnner on the sides than at the front. 
(3) Low vertical obliquity angles, i.e., the vertical 
angles of attack on the side surfaces are the same as the low 
(1~7°) dive angles occasioned by the low altitude tactics of 
the pilots. 
(4) Ammunition stowed at sides of hulls. 
The operational effectiveness of the A-10 under the 
conditions of the test can be approximated by the average 
number of Kills achieved per firing pass. Kills are described 
largely in terms of the damage inflicted with the most decisive 
damage being catastrophic (internal explosion and/or fire) and 
perhaps the next and most important being mobility type damage 
for modern motorized ground forces. The following averages 
were derived from t.h~ firing test, and, based on the empirical 
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and significantly unconstrained nature of the test, are valu-




A-10 Passes = 
4 
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A-45 
4 = rr = 0.33 
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TAB A TO APPENDIX A 
DEFINITIONS 
The terms used in this report, are defined below: 
IMPACT - Any evidence of a projectile strike against 
any portion of the target. Ground ricochets striking the 
target were classified as "impacts". 
PERFORATION - Any rupture of the armored envelope caused 
by an impacting projectile which results in behind-the-plate 
effects by the projectile or spall fragments. A perforation 
can occur only when the armor is impacted. The word "Per-
foration" was deliberately selected to avoid the ambiguities 
which may occur through use of the word "penetration". 
HIT - Any impact not classified as a perforation. 
MOBILITY KILL (M-KILL) - Loss of tacti_cal mobility re-
sulting from damage which cannot be repaired by the crew on 
the battlefield. A tank is considered to have sustained an 
M-Kill when it is no longer capable of executing controlled 
movement on the battlefield. Mobility is DEGRADED when a 
tank can no longer maintain its position in the formation of 
which it is a part. · 
FIREPOWER KILL (F-KILL) - Loss of tactical firepower 
resulting from damage which cannot be repaired by the crew 
on the batlefield. A tank is considered to have sustained 
an F-Kill when it is incapable of delivering controlled fire 
from its main armament. Firepower is DEGRADED when a tank 
can no loriger maintain its "normal" rate-of-fire, velocity, 
accuracy, time to shift targets, etc .. 
CATASTROPHIC KILL (K-KILL) - A tank is considered to 
have sustained a K-Kill when both an M-Kill and an F-Kill 
have occurred as the result of killing fires and explosions 
from ignited fuel and/or ammunition. A tank which has suf-
fered a K-Kill is considered not to be economically repair-
able, and by U.S. standards, would be abandoned on the 
battlefield. 
ATTACK ASPECT - The angle of approach of the aircraft 
with respect to th~ orientation of the target with 0° repre-
senting the centerline of the tank with the bow and gun for-
ward and 180° representing the rear of the tank. 
TAB A-1 
SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE - Damage to a target, component, or 
sub-system which results in a loss of function to the tar-
get, component, or sub-system and which contributes to the 
assessed mobility of fire power kill. 
INSIGNIFICANT DAMAGE - Damage to a target, component, 
or sub-system which results in no loss of function and which 
makes no contribution to the overall kill. Good maintenance 
practices requires repair or replacement of such items at 
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